The 3rd Eye

[인용] Ludwig Wittgenstein & Matthew B. Ostrow

6.54 나의 명제들은 다음과 같은 점에 의해서 하나의 주해 작업이다. 즉 나를 이해하는 사람은, 만일 그가 나의 명제들을 통해 -- 나의 명제들을 딛고서 -- 나의 명제들을 넘어 올라간다면, 그는 결국 나의 명제들을 무의미한 것으로 인식한다. (그는 말하자면 사다리를 딛고 올라간 후에는 그 사다리를 던져 버려야 한다.)

It is now possible to describe in a new way Wittgenstein's declaration of the nonsensicality of his own propositions at 6.54. Rather than a neutral summing-up of the real purpose of the Tractatus, this remark would seem to function as a way of orienting us toward the text as a whole, of indicating how we are to read it. Nonsense, we might say, forms the lens through which all Wittgenstein's propositions are to be viewd: we grasp his point just when we are inclined to understand these remarks as nonsense. That, of course, is not to explain the meaning of the term "nonsense" in the Tractatus, but to face us back toward the text. It is to suggest that the nonsensicality of Wittgenstein's propositions only emerges through a detailed consideration of those propositions themselves, that it cannot be understood apart from such a consideration. My contention, in other words, is that the Wittgensteinian view of the nature of his own claims, of philosophy generally, is not expressible in some self-standing formula, but is rather given entirely in and through the recognition of an intrinsic instability in a particular kind of utterance; it is contained in the seeing how our philosophical assertions change their charater, how they undermined their own initial presentaion as straightfoward thruth claims.